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Abstract
Weinvestigate the welfareimplications of eliminatinga proportional cap-
ital income tax for a model economy in which heterogeneous households face
labor income risk and trade only one asset. Labor taxes rises at the time
of the reform to maintain long run budget balance. Our stochastic process
for labor earnings is consistent with empirical estimates of earnings risk,
and also implies a distribution of asset holdings across households closely
resembling that in the United States.
We …nd that a vast majority of households prefers the status quo to
the tax reform. This …nding is interesting in light of the fact that our
reform would be optimal if we abstracted from heterogeneity and assumed
a representative agent. Initial household productivity and initial household
wealth are independently important in determining a particular household’s
expected gain or loss, in constrast to a complete markets economy in which
only the ratio of asset to labor income matters.
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This paper explores the relation between what is taxed and who is taxed. In the
representative agent framework, a common …nding is that the optimal tax pro-
gram involves zero taxation of capital income in the long run (see Chamley 1986,
Judd 1985, or the recent paper by Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe 1999). However,
representative agent models abstract from the fact that in practice an increased
reliance on labor taxation is likely to be regressive, since low income households
receive a large fraction of their income from labor relative to the fraction they
receive from asset income.1 Thus reducing the tax rate on capital income will
increase the poor’s share of the tax burden initially, even though in the long run
all households will bene…t from the higher pre-tax income associated with an
increase in the capital stock.
The goal of this paper is to quantitativelyassess the distributional implications
of tax reform within a calibrated model of the U.S. economy. The model economy
is populated by a large number of in…nitely-lived households who face uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor income risk. Households can achieve a degree of consumption
smoothing by adjusting precautionary holdings of a single asset, provided they
do not violate an exogenous borrowing limit. Because productivity shocks are
uncorrelated across households, the model generates endogenous distributions of
income and wealth.
There is a government which …nances constant expenditure by levying propor-
tional taxes on labor and asset income, and by issuing debt. The tax reforms we
consider are permanent unanticipated changes in the capital income tax rate. We
require these reforms to be sustainable in the sense that following a tax change,
the time path for government debt is non-explosive. Thus at the same time that
the capital income tax rate is changed, the labor income tax rate is also adjusted
to ensure that the economy eventually converges to a steady state in which gov-
ernment debt is constant and …nite.
We are interested in the relative quantitative importance of increased pro-
ductive e¢ciency versus redistribution between households receiving a relatively
large fraction of income from assets (who we will refer to as the wealth-rich)
and households who receive a relatively large fraction of income from labor (the
wealth-poor). We therefore calibrate the household earnings process to satisfy
two criteria: (i) the persistence and variance of earnings shocks are consistent
with estimates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and (ii) the wealth
distribution generated endogenously by the model closely resembles that observed
1Diaz Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull 1997give a breakdown of sources of income by income
level for U.S. households in the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances.
2in the United States.
In order to understand the importance of our asset market structure for the
e¤ects of tax changes, we compare the predictions of the incomplete markets
economy to those of an economy in which markets are complete, but on which we
impose the initial steady state wealth distribution from the incomplete markets
economy. There are several reasons why we expect the welfare e¤ects of tax
changes to be sensitive to the assumed market structure.
First, note that because di¤erent households in the incomplete markets econ-
omy experience di¤erent paths for earnings, we will observe mobility within the
income and wealth distributions.2 For example, a household that experiences
an increase in labor productivity will immediately jump further up the income
distribution, and by increasing savings typically move upwards in the wealth dis-
tribution. If we assume that the process for household productivity is stationary,
then households’ expected earnings and wealth will converge to the economy-
wide average in the long run. Thus households who initially depend heavily on
labor income can expect to receive a larger fraction of income from wealth in
the future, and may therefore favor reducing capital income taxation even if this
would increase their total tax bill in the short run. By contrast, when markets
are complete, the ranking of households by wealth is …xed through time.
A second consideration is that when markets are incomplete, the aggregate
capital stock in the pre-reform steady state is enlarged by precautionary sav-
ings. Households are willing to hold assets despite an equilibrium return that is
lower than the rate of time preference because by adjusting asset holdings they
can achieve a time path for consumption that is smoother than that for labor
income (see Aiyagari 1994). The welfare implications of this phenomenon are
unclear. On the one hand, a higher pre-reform capital stock reduces the potential
e¢ciency gains from reducing capital income taxes. On the other hand, the as-
sociated increase in the capital stock should both improve households’ ability to
smooth consumption, and at the same time reduce the idiosyncratic uncertainty
households face by increasing the average ratio of post-tax asset to labor income.
Related Literature
In a seminal paper, Judd (1985) studies tax reforms for an economy in which
households di¤er in their initial capital holdings, under the assumption that asset
markets are complete. He shows that agents with below average wealth will desire
an immediate permanent capital income tax increase if the current tax rate is
su¢ciently low. In a calibrated model with two types of household, Garcia-Mila,
Marcet and Ventura (1995) examine the trade-o¤ when reducing capital taxes
2For data on wealth and earnings mobility in the U.S., see Dias-Gimenez et. al. 1997.
3between the e¢ciency gains in terms of increased production, and the losses
experienced by the wealth-poor type as a result of higher labor taxation. Their
main …nding is that the redistribution e¤ect typically dominates, and thus that
a reduction in capital taxes leaves the wealth-poor type worse o¤. However, they
also assume complete markets, so it is not clear that their conclusions will still
obtain in an economy which allows for mobility within the income and wealth
distributions.
Using an overlapping generations (OLG) framework, Auerbach and Kotliko¤
(1987) …nd that switching from a general income tax to a labor income tax mainly
bene…ts the current old (who receive a high fraction of income from wealth)
while the policy imposes large welfare costs on the current young generations
(whose income consists mainly of labor earnings). The wealth distribution in
the Auerbach and Kotliko¤ model is endogenous, as in our incomplete markets
economy, but savings behavior is driven by life-cycle rather than precautionary
motives.
Conesa and Krueger (1999) analyze social security reform in an OLG economy
in which households face uninsurable shocks that lead to heterogeneity within age
cohorts, as well as across generations. Households contemplate a switch from a
pay-as-you-go social securitysystem to a fullyfunded one, which involves reducing
labor income taxation (the pay-roll tax) and at the same time con…scating all
claims to the social security system. Although the reform does involve intra-
generational redistribution, Conesa and Krueger’s results are driven primarily by
inter-generational redistribution: most of the losers are middle aged and elderly.
We choose to abstract from inter-generational issues for two reasons: they are
likely to be less important for the issue of factor taxation than for social security
reform, and there is a large literature on optimal factor taxation in the in…nite
horizon setting that is a useful reference point for thinking about the welfare
implications of tax reform.
Aiyagari (1995) de…nes an optimal tax problem for an incomplete markets
economy similar to ours in which he does not constrain tax rates to be time-
invariant following the initial reform. He argues that if the optimal tax program
converges, then the tax rate of capital income in that steady state is positive.3
While the reforms we consider are unlikely to be solutions to the unconstrained
optimal tax problem, our approach has the advantage that it enables us to ex-
plicitly characterize both transition following the reform and the steady state to
which the economy eventually converges.
Findings
3Judd (1985) in an economy with heterogeneous agents but complete markets …nds the op-
timal long run tax rate on capital income to be zero.
4The reform we primarily focus on involves moving from the current calibrated
U.S. capital income tax rate (39:7 percent) to a capital income tax rate of zero.
Eliminating capital income taxation is a natural benchmark, since our assumption
that labor is inelastically supplied means that this policy is in the class of optimal
tax reforms for a representative agent economy. We compute the expected welfare
gain for the representative agent in a complete markets economy, and …nd it to
be equivalent to a permanent 1:07 percent increase in consumption. This is a
large gain relative, for example, to previous estimates of the likely bene…ts of
eliminating business cycles.
When households di¤er, however, the welfare e¤ects of the same policy change
vary greatly depending on initial household wealth and productivity. None of the
tax changes we consider are Pareto improving.4 Moreover the majority of house-
holds lose from eliminating capital income taxation: 73 percent of households lose
in the incomplete markets economy, while 72 percent do so in the complete mar-
kets economy. The average change in expected utility is equivalent to a permanent
0:88 percent fall in consumption in the incomplete markets economy. Households
with higher initial wealth are more likely to be winners, and on average gain more,
in both economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the economic
environment. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2. The Models
We consider two model economies: one in which households have access to a
single savings instrument and face a no-borrowing constraint, and a second in
which households can trade a complete set of state contingent claims.
Both economies are populated by a large number of ex ante identical and in-
…nitely lived households. Households supply labor inelastically and maximize the
expected discounted utility from consumption. In aggregate, household savings
decisions determine the evolution of the aggregate capital stock, which in turn de-
termines aggregate output and the return to saving. There is a government which
…nances constant government spending by issuing one period debt and levying
taxes. From the households’ perspective, debt and capital are perfect substitutes
since the one period return to both is risk free, and there are no transaction costs.
4This is not the case in Chamley (1998), who considers tax changes pre-announced far in
advance, so that a household’s expected position within the income / wealth distribution at the
time of the tax change is independent of its current position. Thus Chamley is able to char-
acterize tax reforms that leave all households better o¤. Note that households in our economy
expect to be average roughly two hundred years into the future (see …gure 5):
5An equilibrium condition is that aggregate asset holdings at each date must equal
the sum of the capital stock and the stock of outstanding government debt. To
focus on the e¤ects of tax changes, we abstract from other sources of aggregate
risk.
We assume that households face idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. In
the incomplete markets model economy, markets which in principle could al-
low complete insurance against this risk do not exist. Instead there is a single
risk-free savings instrument which enables households to partially self-insure by
accumulating precautionary asset holdings, as in Aiyagari (1994) and Aiyagari
and McGrattan (1998). An important assumption is that no borrowing is per-
mitted. This limits the ability of low-wealth households to smooth consumption
in the face of falls in their disposable income.
In the complete markets economy, by contrast, households can perfectly in-
sure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and choose complete insurance in
equilibrium. Thus we can think of the complete markets economy as a world
in which households make consumption and savings decisions as though house-
hold productivity were constant through time and identical across households.
Since the momentary utility function is such that the Engel curve is linear in
lifetime wealth, the evolution of aggregate variables in equilibrium does not de-
pend on the distribution of wealth at the date of a tax change (see Chatterjee
1994). However, since we assume that households cannot insure against the (zero
probability) event of a tax reform, the welfare implications of tax reform in our
complete markets economy will be sensitive to the shape of the initial wealth
distribution.
We now give a more formal description of the incomplete markets economy.
The complete markets economy may be viewed as a special case of the incomplete
markets economy in which all productivity levels are the same, and this economy-
wide household productivity level is normalized to 1:
The environment
Each in…nitely-lived household supplies n labor hours per period. Household
i’s productivity at date t is denoted by eit and takes one of three possible values,
eit 2 E = fel;em;ehg: Productivity is assumed to be i.i.d. across agents and to
evolve according to a …rst-order Markov process. The 3£3 transition probability




a history of productivity shocks up to date t; and let ½(etje0) denote the date 0
conditional probability that a household assigns to history et given e0:
Let ci(et) denote the consumption of household i given productivity history










and ° > 0 is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion.
Let ait¡1 2 A = R+ denote household i’s asset holdings at the start of period
t, corresponding to a savings decision taken at t ¡ 1: The real return at t to one
unit of the asset purchased at t ¡1 is rt¡1: The real return to supplying one unit
of e¤ective labor at date t is wt: Asset and labor income are taxed proportionally
at constant rates ¿k and ¿n respectively. The budget constraint of household i is
given by
ci(e









at¡1 + (1 ¡ ¿
n)wt¡1eitn: (2.2)
Let the distribution of households across productivity and asset holdings at
date t be described by Ãt(¢); a probability measure de…ned on S; the set of all
subsets of E £ A: Aggregate e¤ective per capita labor supply is constant across








Real per capita government spending is constant and equal to G: Government
debt issued at date t is denoted Bt and is assumed to be risk-free; the government
guarantees the one period real return between t and t + 1 at the start of period













7Aggregate per capita output at t; Yt; is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas






where ® 2 [0;1].
Output can be transformed into future capital, consumption and government
spending according to
Ct + G + Kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1 = Yt
where ± 2 [0; 1] is the rate of depreciation.
Product and factor markets are assumed to be competitive: This and the
absence of aggregate productivity shocks implies a certain one period real return
to saving in the form of capital.5 Since the real one period return to debt is also
known in advance (the government guarantees it), in equilibrium the two assets
must pay the same real return. This is why it is not necessary to specify the
division between capital and bonds in an individual’s portfolio.
The households’ problem
In the pre-tax reform steady state, households take as given constant prices r
and w; and constant tax rates ¿ k and ¿n: Otherwise the steady state household
problem is identical to the post reform problem, which we now describe.
Let t = 0 denote the date of the tax change. At the start of period 0; a pair
of new permanent tax rates ¿k and ¿n is announced and households re-optimize.
This involves choosing ci(et) 8t and 8et 2 Et where ci(et) solves the following
problem.
Maximize 2.1 such that
1. ei0 and ai¡1 are given.
2. 8t and 8et 2 Et the household’s budget constraint (eq. 2.2) is satis…ed, con-
sumption is non-negative, and the borrowing constraint for asset holdings
is satis…ed, ait 2 A.




t=0 ; and tax rates are ¿k and
¿n:
5Of course, prior to the tax reform households expectations over future after-tax interest
rates are incorrect; we make the standard assumption in this type of exercise that the reform is
assumed to be a zero probability event.
84. 8t and 8et 2 Et the conditional probability of household productivity his-
tory ½(etje0) is consistent with the transition probability matrix ¼e: For
example, suppose et is any history of length t such that et = ei: Then if
et+1 is the history et followed by et+1 = ej
½(e
t+1je0) = ½(e
tje0) £ ¼e(i;j) 8ej 2 E:
Equilibrium
A post-reform equilibrium for this economy is a pair of constant tax rates ¿k




t=0 such that when all
households take prices and taxes as given and solve their maximization problems,
the markets for capital, labor and output clear, and government debt is stationary.
A formal de…nition of equilibrium is given in appendix A.2.
2.1. Parameterization
The model period is one year. All parameter values used are reported in yearly
terms in table 1. The parameters relating to aggregate production and prefer-
ences are set to standard values. Capital’s share in the Cobb-Douglas production
function is 0:36 and the depreciation rate is 0:1: The risk aversion parameter ° is
set to 1; implying logarithmic utility, and the discount factor ¯ is 0:96.
The household productivity process
The main question addressed in the paper is how the presence of heterogene-
ity changes the welfare implications of tax reform, and the approach taken is
to generate heterogeneity endogenously as a consequence of households receiv-
ing uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Thus the speci…cation of the
process for these shocks is critical, since the choices here will determine how di¤er-
ent households are in equilibrium, and therefore how di¤erently they experience
changes in …scal policy. Broadly speaking there are two desiderata for the income
process. The …rst is that the labor income uncertainty households experience is
consistent with empirical estimates from panel data, so that the model is able to
deliver appropriate time series variability in household income and consumption,
and plausible levels of aggregate precautionary saving. The second is that the
model economy generates realistic heterogeneity in terms of the distributions of
labor and capital income, so that the tax reform involves a realistic redistribution
of the tax burden.
9We assume a three state process for productivity, since we found this to be
the smallest number of states required to match overall wealth concentration
and at the same time reproduce the fact that in the data the wealth-poorest
two quintiles hold a positive fraction of total wealth. To reduce the number of
free parameters, we assume that households cannot move between the high and
low productivity levels directly, that the fraction of high productivity households
equals the fraction of low productivity households, and that the probabilities
of moving from the medium productivity state into either of the others are the
same. These assumptions constitute four restrictions on the transition probability
matrix, ¼e. Since each row must add up to 1, we are left with two independent
transition probabilities, p and q; where p = ¼e(eh;eh) and q = ¼e(em;em); and














Assuming that average productivity equals 1; the total number of free para-
meters is four: transition probabilities p and q; and two of the three values for
productivity.
Various authors have estimated stochastic AR(1) processes for logged labor
productivity using data from the PSID. Such a process may be summarized by the
serial correlation coe¢cient, ½, and the standard deviation of the innovation term,
¾. Allowing for the presence of measurement error and the e¤ects of observable
characteristics such as education and age, work by Card (1991), Flodén and Lindé
(1999), Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(1999) indicates a ½ in the range 0:88 to 0:96; and a ¾ in the range 0:12 to
0:25.6 We therefore impose two restrictions on our …nite state Markov process for
productivity: (i) that the …rst order autocorrelation coe¢cient equals 0:9; and (ii)
that the variance for productivity is 0:05=(1¡0:92), corresponding to a standard
deviation for the innovation term in the continuous representation of 0:224:
To generate realistic heterogeneity, we require that the Markov process for
productivity be such that when the model economy is simulated, on average it
reproduces certain features of the wealth distribution recently observed in the
United States.7;8 Given the two restrictions above, the number of remaining free
6Heaton and Lucas (1996) allow for permanent but unobservable household-speci…c e¤ects,
and …nd a much lower ½ of 0:53; and a ¾ of 0:25.
7This approach was pioneered by Castaneda et. al. (1998).
8In an earlier version of the paper we experimented with including the Gini coe¢cient for
earnings as one of our targets. We abandoned this approach for two reasons. First, while esti-
10parameters is two, and we therefore seek to match two properties of the empir-
ical asset holding distribution: (i) the Gini coe¢cient, and (ii) the fraction of
aggregate wealth held by the two poorest quintiles of the population. The …rst
criterion ensures a realistic overall wealth distribution. The second criterion is
designed to capture the bottom tail of the wealth distribution, and we include it
because we expect that the households most likely to lose from reducing capital
taxation are those with below average wealth. Using data from the 1992 Survey
of Consumer Finances, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) report a
wealth Gini of 0:78; and …nd that the two poorest quintiles of the distribution
combined hold 1:35 percent of total wealth.9
Then calibration procedure is described in more detail in appendix A.1. To
our initial surprise, we were able to …nd parameter values that satisfy all four cri-
teria. This …nding is interesting in light of the debate as to whether uninsurable
‡uctuations in earnings can account for U.S. households’ wealth accumulation
patterns (see Quadrini and Rios Rull 1997). Table 4 provides a detailed compar-
ison between the asset holding distribution observed in the data, and the steady
state pre-reform distribution implied by the calibrated incomplete markets model.
The values for productivity in the parameter set that matches our four targets
are widelyand asymmetricallyspaced. The ratios between the productivity values







The two transition probabilities are
p = 0:9; q = 0:988
which imply that at any point in time 5:25 percent of households have the high
productivity level and the same percentage have the low productivity level.
Fiscal policy parameters
All remaining parameters relate to …scal policy. The initial tax rates are
calibrated to match the actual tax rates in the U.S. Since we are interested in the
extent to which tax reform shifts the tax burden across households, we calibrate to
average rather than marginal tax rates. Using the method outlined in Mendoza,
mates of the wealth Gini are stable across di¤erent data sources, estimates of Gini coe¢cients for
earnings and income di¤er substantially. For example, Quadrini (1999) reports a Gini coe¢cient
for income of 0:45 using PSID data, compared to 0:57 using SCF data. Second, in the model
we abstract from various types of observable heterogeneity, such as di¤erences in education and
age, that we believe are essential for explaining the observed distribution of earnings. This is
why our model generates a Gini coe¢cient for earnings of only 0:21:
9Kennickell and Woodburn (1999) report a wealth Gini of 0:788 for the 1995 SCF data.
11Razin and Tesar (1994) we calculate average tax rates for the United States, the
United Kingdom, France and Germany using OECD data. These are presented in
table 2. For the period 1990-96, the capital income tax rate in the U.S. averaged
39:7 percent, while the labor income tax rate averaged 26:9 percent.
Constant government debt B in the pre-reform steady state is set to match
the 67 percent debt / GDP ratio observed in post-war U.S data. Initial constant
government spending G is set to ensure budget balance and is therefore not an
independent parameter choice. However, the implied ratio of government spend-
ing to annual output is 0:20 (see table 3) which is close to the U.S. average of
0:19 between 1990-96.
2.2. Solution method
While techniques for solving for steady states in models with incomplete markets
and heterogenous agents are fairly well established, less work has been done on
developing methods for solving for transition between steady states in economies
with production and incomplete markets. Exceptions are Huggett (1997) and
Conesa and Krueger (1999). We describe our approach in appendix A.3.
2.3. Welfare measures
Our measure of welfare gains and losses is standard, and we now describe it
for the incomplete markets economy (the complete markets economy is treated
analogously).
Let cR
i (et) be equilibrium consumption at date t for household i given pro-
ductivity history et in the case in which there is a tax reform at date 0, and
let cNR
i (et) be the same thing in the case of no tax reform. The welfare gain
for household i as a result of the reform is de…ned as the percentage increase in
consumption that gives the household the same utility when the reform is imple-
mented as when there is no reform but consumption is increased at each date by













In the complete markets economy, a household’s welfare gain or loss is a known
function of initial household wealth. In the incomplete markets case, initially
identical households experience di¤erent subsequent productivity histories, and
therefore experience the reform di¤erently.
In table 5 we report the average ex post welfare gain by initial wealth quin-
tile and by initial productivity, where the initial steady state distribution over
12individual states is used to assign households to groups. In table 6 we report the
expected welfare gain or loss for households with various initial combinations of
wealth and productivity. These numbers are computed by …rst creating a large
arti…cial population each member of which has shares the initial wealth and pro-
ductivity level of interest. The economy is then simulated forward (using the
equilibrium sequence for interest rates) under both scenarios for …scal policy.
We would like to be able to assess whether the changes in welfare that result
from the tax reform occur because the tax reform a¤ects the e¢ciency of pro-
duction at the aggregate level, or because it involves a redistribution of existing
resources. One way to control for the redistributional e¤ects of reform is to con-
sider the lifetime utility households would enjoy if they got to consume the same
fraction of aggregate consumption in every date and state in the case of reform
as they do without reform.






denote aggregate consumption at date t in the








t)Ãt(¢) j 2 fR;NRg:
Let b ci(et) denote the hypothetical value for i’s consumption in case of reform
if the household got to consume the same fraction of aggregate consumption as














































Comparing (2.4), (2.7) and (2.8) it is straightforward to show that the total
welfare gain for household i is the product of the e¢ciency gain and the distrib-
utional gain:









13A slightly less trivial result, formalized in the following proposition, is that
with logarithmic utility, the e¢ciency gains are the same for all households and
equal to the e¢ciency gain of a household with average consumption.
Proposition 2.1. If u(c) = log(c), then for both market structures (i) ¢e
i = ¢e









Proof. See appendix A.4
A tax reform is e¢cient if the e¢ciency gain is positive, that is if ¢e > 0.10
3. Results
In discussing our results, we focus primarily on the benchmark tax reform in
which capital taxes are eliminated. These results are reported in tables 3 to 6
and in …gures 1 to 7: In subsection 3.3 we discuss alternative tax reforms.
3.1. Findings
1. Both capital and government debt increase during transition, but the in-
creases are smaller in the incomplete markets economy.
2. Eliminating capital income taxation reduces wealth concentration in the
long run. In the complete markets economy, for example, a household with
zero wealth at the time of the tax reform has 7:4 percent of mean wealth in
the steady state to which the economy eventually converges.
3. When markets are complete, a household with mean wealth (the represen-
tative agent) sees a welfare gain of 1:07 percent in permanent consumption
from eliminating the capital tax.11
4. Eliminating capital income taxation leads to a positive e¢ciency gain in
both market structures. The e¢ciency gain is smaller when markets are
incomplete.
10Of course, e¢ciency does not imply that the reform leaves everyone better o¤, since house-
holds typically do not consume the same fractions of aggregate consumption in the no refrom
economy as in the reform economy: ¢d
i is typically non-zero.
11This is large compared, for example, to previous estimates of the bene…ts of eliminating
business cycles.
145. For both parameterizations and market structures, the majority of house-
holds lose ex post from the tax reform. In the incomplete markets economy
73:4 percent of households lose, while 71:7 percent lose in the complete
markets economy.
6. The welfare e¤ects of reform vary greatly depending on initial household
wealth and productivity. In a representative sample of 9;600 households,
the ex post change in welfare in the incomplete markets economy ranges
from the equivalent of a 3:7 percent permanent fall in consumption to a
13:6 percent increase.
7. The average change in welfare for the entire population is negative: ¡0:44
percent of consumption in the complete markets economy versus ¡0:88
percent of consumption in the incomplete markets economy.
8. Households with higher initial wealth are more likely to be winners. On
average, households in the lower three wealth quintiles lose around 3 percent
in terms of constant consumption while those in the top quintile gain around
6 percent.
9. Controlling for initial wealth, in the incomplete markets economy house-
holds with initially higher productivity are less a¤ected one way or the
other by the reform.
10. The asset market structure does not appear to greatly a¤ect the general
results, and in particular the main conclusions survive across market struc-
tures: most households lose from eliminating capital income taxation, and
the average welfare change is negative.
3.2. Interpretation
Aggregate variables
Rios-Rull (1994) shows that in calibrated model economies aggregate variables
can behave in a similar manner under complete and incomplete market structures.
In our complete markets economy, the long run e¤ect of eliminating capital taxes
is to increase capital, output, consumption and government debt. The dynamics
for aggregate variables are very similar in the incomplete markets economy (see
…gure 1). The fact that the capital stock is always larger when markets are
incomplete re‡ects the fact that households accumulate precautionary savings
when they are unable to purchase insurance. As the capital stock (and government
debt) increases during transition, so do per capita asset holdings. Thus the typical
15household in the incomplete markets economy has more wealth to use to smooth
consumption in response to income shocks, and the demand for precautionary
savings falls. This is why the increase in the capital stock is smaller in the
incomplete markets economy.
The reason why government debt increases more in the complete markets
economy is that the capital stock increases by a greater amount in transition.
Thus for any given labor income tax the di¤erence between revenue from taxation
immediately after the reform and revenue in the eventual steady state is relatively
larger. If the increase in government revenue during transition is larger when
markets are complete, total government outlays must also increase by a larger
amount to ensure a stationary path for debt. Since real government spending
is assumed …xed, higher outlays must come from a larger increase in interest
payments on debt, which implicitly corresponds to a larger increase in the stock
of debt.
Why does it take roughly 40 years for the capital stock to approach the new
steady state level? One reason is that the total increase in the capital stock
is large: 32 percent in the complete markets economy, for example. With an
initial capital to output ratio of 2:13 this increase amounts to 68:2 percent of
initial GDP, while initial aggregate consumption is only 58:4 percent of GDP (see
table 3). With mild consumption smoothing (log-utility), the optimal plan for a
household with average wealth is to gradually increase asset holdings such that
only after about 10 years does consumption exceed the initial steady state level
(see …gure 2)
Welfare
In a representative agent setting with exogenous labor supply, labor income
taxation is e¤ectively lump-sum and eliminating capital income taxation is in the
class of optimal tax reforms. Eliminating the capital income tax means that in
the long run the capital stock increases to a level at which the household’s inter-
temporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption at di¤erent dates
is equated to the marginal rate of transformation in production between those
dates. In the economy with complete markets but heterogeneity with respect to
initial wealth, the e¢ciency gain from tax reform is equal to the welfare gain of
a household that has mean wealth at the time of the reform (see tables 6 and 7).
When markets are incomplete, the e¢ciencygain from reform remains positive
but is much smaller than in the complete markets case. There are several reasons
for this. First, the increase in the capital stock is smaller in the incomplete mar-
kets economy, which reduces the potential e¢ciency gain. Second, precautionary
saving means that the initial capital stock is higher when markets are incomplete,
16and consequently the marginal bene…t from an in increase in the stock is smaller.
Finally, Aiyagari (1995) argues that if the optimal tax program in this type of
economy converges to a steady state, then the optimal tax rate on capital in that
steady state is positive. Although our tax reform is not likely to be optimal, this
…nding nonetheless suggests that eliminating capital taxation, as we do, leads to
excessive capital accumulation from an e¢ciency point of view.
A second factor determining who gains and who loses is that emphasized by
Garcia-Mila et. al. (1996). If households di¤er in the initial fractions of their in-
come theyreceive from asset holdings versus labor supply, then eliminating capital
income taxation e¤ectively shifts the burden of taxation away from households
who receive a large fraction of their income from capital and towards those who
receive a large fraction from labor. An implicit assumption here, of course, is
that markets to insure against the redistributive e¤ects of future tax changes do
not exist; if they did all households would share equally in the e¢ciency gains
associated with the reform.12
Figures 4 and 6 show how tax payments change after the reform for di¤erent
households depending on initial wealth. Households with low wealth (and in the
incomplete markets case high productivity) see the largest initial increase in their
tax bills. In the complete markets economy the fraction of income received from
wealth is strictly increasing in wealth. There is a certain value for wealth such
that all richer households bene…t from the tax reform, while all poorer households
lose (see …gure 7). When markets are complete, the indi¤erent household lies in
the 72nd percentile of the initial wealth distribution and has 70:4 percent of mean
per capita wealth. The household with median wealth has only 4:6 percent of
mean wealth. This is one measure of how far away we are from …nding a majority
in favor of eliminating capital income taxes.
The redistributive e¤ect of changing the balance between labor and capital
taxation is also present in the incomplete markets economy. In addition to shifting
the tax burden, however, the increase in capital stock increases the share of capital
income of total income. With our assumption of no aggregate risk, the return
on capital is known upon investment, and the uncertainty households face about
future income is reduced. The reduced riskiness in the economy, reduces the
demand for precautionary spending, which enables households to increase its
consumption. This makes more households favor the tax reform.
The third column of table 5 shows the average initial ratio of asset to labor
income for households in di¤erent parts of the initial wealth and productivity
distributions. When households are ranked by initial wealth it appears that the
12One might therefore argue that it is misleading to label the economy in which labor income
risk can be perfectly insured the “complete markets” economy.
17ratio of asset to labor income is closely related to the expected welfare gain. When
households are ranked by initial productivity, however, the low productivity type
initially receive the largest fraction of income from wealth, yet they appear to fare
worst as a result of the tax change, both on average and in terms of the fraction
of households ex post worse o¤. Thus it is clear that in this economy, while the
redistribution of the tax burden on impact still plays a role, tax reform must also
a¤ect the welfare calculus in subtler ways.
The e¤ect of market incompleteness
Luck is one of several factors not present in the complete markets analysis
that come into play when considering who gains and who loses from tax reform
in an environment with uncertainty and missing markets. Two households with
identical wealth and productivity at the time of the shock might view the reform
very di¤erently ex post depending on their subsequent fortune. From …gure 7
it is clear that there is considerable variation in the experienced welfare gain of
households with identical initial wealth. For example, in our sample population
with 9;600 households, the poorest household to gain ex post had 6:6 percent of
mean initial wealth, while the richest household to lose started with 200:5 percent
of mean initial wealth.
When markets are incomplete, households move around within the income
and wealth distributions. Contrary to the complete markets case, the ratio of
household capital to labor income at the time of the shock is no longer a su¢-
cient statistic for predicting a household’s expected gain or loss from the reform.
Households with low wealth but high labor productivity face the largest percent-
age increase in their total tax bill initially (see …gure 6): However, since they wish
to accumulate wealth quickly (see …gure 5) they are well placed to take advantage
of the increase in the after-tax return to saving, and after a few years expect to
pay less tax than they would have in the absence of reform. Even so, they expect
to lose from the reform, because in the long run the after tax return on capital re-
turns towards its pre-reform level. This suggest that removing the capital income
tax do not primary bene…t future capital holders but is rather a large windfall
gain for current wealthy.
Figure 6 shows that households wishing and able to dis-save (those with high
wealth but low productivity) pay lower taxes initially but in the future expect to
pay more as they become increasingly dependent on highly-taxed labor income.
This is why these households increase saving in the short run (relative to the no-
reform case). The households that expect to fare worst are those who start out
with low productivity and zero wealth. These households pay more tax initially,
and do not want to accumulate wealth quickly since they expect higher labor
18productivity in the future. Thus they do not bene…t from the temporarily high
after-tax return to saving.
In the long run all households are the same, in that their expectations of
future income and wealth are independent of their current income and wealth.
Convergence of expected productivity is illustrated in …gure 6; and accounts for
the convergence in expected consumption and wealth paths for di¤erent types of
households seen in …gure 5. This might lead one to expect that the distributional
e¤ects highlighted by Garcia-Mila et. al. would be swamped by e¢ciency gains
in an incomplete markets setting. There are two reasons why this is not what
we …nd. First, productivity shocks are very persistent relative to the households’
rate of time preference. Second, the initial distribution of wealth is so skewed
that tax reform involves substantial redistribution even in the short run.
The importance of initial household wealth as a predictor of how much a house-
hold has to gain from tax reform is clear from table 6 and …gure 7, which show the
expected welfare gain by initial asset holdings. Not surprisingly, wealthy house-
holds have most to gain from eliminating taxes on capital income. The importance
of initial productivity is more complicated. The last panel in …gure 7 shows that
households with high productivity are less a¤ected one way or the other by the tax
reform. High productivity households with very low wealth lose initially from the
increase in labor taxes, but they lose less than low productivity households since
they plan to accumulate un-taxed wealth quickly. High-wealth high-productivity
households gain less than equally wealthy low productivity households, since they
receive a larger fraction of their income from labor, and are therefore hit harder
by the increase in the labor income tax. From table 6; a low productivity house-
hold with mean wealth expects a gain of 1:51 percent of consumption while the
high productivity household only expects a gain of 0:72 percent.
A …nal factor that comes into play when markets are incomplete is that the tax
reform a¤ects the frequency with which the no-borrowing constraint binds, both
in transition and in the eventual steady state. Households with both low wealth
and low productivity (and who are therefore likely to be borrowing-constrained)
are pushed even harder onto their borrowing constraint when the tax on labor
income increases in order to o¤set the loss in capital income tax revenue. At the
same time, in the new steady state aggregate capital and debt are both higher
than in the initial steady state, and the after-tax return on asset holdings is also
higher. This means that the opportunity cost of accumulating a bu¤er-stock of
savings is reduced, and that in the long run all households are better able to
smooth consumption (in addition to having higher consumption on average).
193.3. Alternative tax reforms
We investigate two alternative tax reforms. In the …rst we consider a smaller
decrease in the capital income tax rate. In particular, we set the post reform
capital income tax to 25:6 percent, which is the average of our estimates of the
French and German average tax rates on capital income in the 1990’s (see table
2). We call this the European tax reform. In our second alternative reform we
increase the capital income tax rate to the U.K. level of 47:7 percent. We call this
the U.K. tax reform. A comparison of the welfare implications of the di¤erent
reforms is presented in table 7:
European tax reform
Not surprisingly, the results here are qualitatively very similar to the bench-
mark reform, though quantitatively the welfare changes are of a smaller magni-
tude. A striking …nding is that the number of households that gain is more or
less unchanged, even though the decrease in the capital tax rate is much smaller.
In the incomplete markets economy, for example, 71:3 percent of households lose
from the tax reform, compared to 73:4 percent under the benchmark reform. The
reason the number of households that gain is almost unchanged is that the bot-
tom three quintiles of the wealth distribution hold very little wealth. Thus any
reduction is capital taxes will leave most households paying more tax in the short
run and consequently, we conjecture, worse o¤.
Another important aspect to note is that the e¢ciency gain in the incom-
plete market economy is larger under the European tax reform than under the
benchmark reform. This suggests that overaccumulation of capital do occur when
the capital tax is removed, and that the e¢cient long run capital income tax is
positive even when tax reforms are restricted to once and for all changes.
U.K. tax reform
When we increase the capital tax rate to the estimated U.K. level, we …nd the
economy experiences an e¢ciency loss of 0:17 percent, but that most households
are left better o¤. However, the gains are small, and the average welfare e¤ect
is negative. This suggests that the results of decreasing the capital tax (the Eu-
ropean tax reform) and increasing the capital tax (the U.K. tax reforms) is not
symmetric. While 71:3 percent of households lose ex post as a result of the tax
decrease, and 67:8 percent gain from the tax increase, in both economies the un-
conditional expected change in welfare is negative. We interpret these …ndings as
indicating that the marginal productive e¢ciency cost of capital income taxation
is increasing in the tax rate.
203.4. Alternative parameterizations
In all the tax reforms described above, the high persistence of productivity shocks
relative to households’ rate of time preference reduces the importance of income
mobility in determining welfare gains. We therefore recompute the e¤ects of the
benchmarktax reform using a productivityprocess with less persistence to investi-
gate the extent to which this reduces the cost of the reform for low wealth and low
productivity households. Heaton and Lucas (1996) allow for permanent but un-
observable household-speci…c e¤ects when estimating stochastic AR(1) processes
for logged labor productivity. Their estimates for the autocorrelation coe¢cient
and the variance for productivity are 0:53; and 0:2512=(1 ¡ 0:532) respectively.
As an alternative to our benchmark parameterization we therefore consider
an alternative in which the household productivity process has the Heaton and
Lucas persistence and variance. In this case we are unable to reproduce the
degree of wealth concentration observed in the U.S. We therefore assume that the
productivity shocks are equally spaced, and that the fractions of households in
each state are as in the benchmark parameterization. Given these assumptions,
the wealth Gini in the pre-reform steady state is 0:45 and the poorest 40 percent
of households hold 11:5 percent of total wealth. Thus the model now generates
much less wealth concentration than under the benchmark process. The results
are presented in table 8:
We …nd that a greater fraction of households bene…t from eliminating capital
income taxes under this parameterization: in both economies approximately 50
percent of households are better o¤ ex post as a result of the reform. The average
change in welfare is now positive. As under the benchmark parameterization, the
welfare implications of reform in the complete and incomplete markets economies
remain very similar. This suggests that what is most important for the welfare
implications of tax reform is not the degree of earnings mobility implied by the
productivity process, but rather the degree of concentration in wealth prior to
the reform.
4. Conclusions
The main conclusion we take from this paper is that changing the balance be-
tween capital and labor income taxation is likely to have very large distributional
implications. Reducing taxes on capital income in our model does stimulate in-
vestment, raising output and consumption for all households in the long run.
However, the short run cost in the form of higher labor taxes is too heavy a price
to pay for all except the wealth-richest households. This …nding survives even if
markets are complete and idiosyncratic earnings risk is fully insurable.
21The welfare implications of tax reform vary dramatically with the shape of the
initial wealth distribution. In a representative agent economy the reform we con-
sider is optimal. In a parameterization in which we reproduce the highly concen-
trated distribution of wealth observed in the U.S., over 70 percent of households
are made worse o¤ by eliminating capital income taxation. Thus our quantitative
modelling exercise suggests that for understanding the welfare implications of this
type of …scal reform, it is important to think hard about the right way to model
observed heterogeneity.
In future work we plan to experiment with a wider range of possible labor
/ capital tax combinations, and to …nd the reform in the class of once and for
all changes in tax rates that maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. We
shall also investigate whether there exists a social welfare function with weights
inversely proportional to initial wealth that rationalizes the current balance be-
tween labor and capital taxation.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Calibrating the productivity process
Consider the following AR(1) process for labor productivity
lne
0 = ½ lne + "










1 ¡ ½2 (A.3)
24Equations resembling (A.1) have been estimated on panel data. Our goal to
approximate equation (A.1) by a 3-state Markov chain, preserving the estimated
autocorrelation and variance of log productivity. Let ei, i = 1;2;3 denote the
three productivity levels in our Markov chain, and let ¼i denote the constant
proportion of households with each productivity level in the ergodic distribution
associated with the transition probabilitymatrix, ¼e. Thus
P
i ¼i = 1: The matrix
itself, reproduced here, de…nes the probabilities of moving between productivity









0 1 ¡ p p
3
7 5 (A.4)
Given the symmetry of ¼e; ¼1 = ¼3; and ¼1 is related to p and q as follows.




= (1 ¡ 2¼1)
1 ¡ q
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To enable comparison with the estimated process for log productivity, assume
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Let ¼1 and e2 be such that when the model economy is simulated, on average
it reproduces the two chosen moments characterizing the wealth distribution as
discussed in section 2.1. Once values for these parameters have been chosen,
the goal is to adjust the remaining free parameters so that the process for log
productivity inherits the properties estimated in the data. During this second
stage, ¼1 and e2 are treated as exogenously …xed.
Since ¼3 = ¼1; and
P
i¼i = 1; (A.5) can be rearranged to express q as a
known function of p:
q =
¼2 ¡ 2¼1(1 ¡ p)
¼2
(A.9)
25Equation (A.6) can be rearranged to give an expression for lne3
ln e3 = ¡
¼1 lne1 + ¼2 lne2
¼1
(A.10)
Given ¼1 and e2; and expressions (A.9) and (A.10), the only remaining free
parameters are p and e1:
From (A.3) and (A.7), equating the variances of the discrete and continuous
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Substituting (A.10) into (A.11) then implies
2 (lne1)
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From (A.2), (A.7) and (A.8), equating the autocorrelation of the discrete and
continuous processes for log productivity implies that




2 + ¼2 (lne2)
2 + ¼1 (lne3)
2: (A.13)
Substituting in equation (A.11) this simpli…es to















26A.2. De…nition of equilibrium
We now describe the conditions that jointly characterize the equilibrium path of
the incomplete markets economy following a tax reform at date t = 0.
Let the decision rules ci(et) together with the probabilities ½(etje0) jointly




is the probability that
household i after history et will have productivity and wealth in the set U 2 S
at date t + 1. (Recall that S denotes the set of all subsets of E £ A). Thus 8i;












tje0) £ ¼e (et;e)
where ait is given by subtracting ci(et) from the right hand side of 2.2, and I is
an indicator function.
An equilibrium is a pair of constant tax rates ¿k and ¿n and a sequence
of measures fÃt(¢)g
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and 8et 2 Et such that 8t; 8et 2 Et; and 8i :



















3. The market for savings clears.
Kt + Bt =
Z
aitdÃt (¢) = At:
4. Factor markets clear.
rt¡1 = ®K®¡1
t¡1 n1¡® ¡ ±:
wt = (1 ¡ ®)K®
t¡1n¡®:













6. The goods market clears.
Ct + G + Kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1 = Yt:
27A.3. Solution algorithm
1. Solve for the initial steady state given the initial capital tax rate as follows.
1. Guess a value for the capital stock (and thus implicitly for output).
2. Compute the government spending G, such that given the labor tax
¿n, government debt B remains constant at the target ratio for debt
to GDP.
3. Simulate the economy to compute a stationary asset holding distribu-
tion.
4. Check that aggregate household savings decisions equal aggregate cap-
ital plus aggregate debt.
5. Adjust the guess for the capital stock and iterate until the market for
savings clears.
2. Choose a new value for the capital tax ¿k. Assume this is announced before
households make decisions in period 1.
3. Assume that the economy converges to a new steady state and that it is in
this steady state in period T:
4. Guess a sequence K2:::KT ¡1 for capital during transition.
5. Solve for the new proportional tax on labor ¿n such that given K2:::KT¡1
and ¿k; government debt is unchanged between T ¡ 1 and T. Compute the
associated path for government debt, B2:::BT:
6. Solve for the …nal steady state using the same procedure outlined in step
one, taking as given tax rates ¿k and ¿n and G and BT: Compute the capital
stock in the new steady state, KT:
7. Solve for household savings decisions in transition as follows.
1. Start in period T ¡ 1:
2. Assume that:
1. capital today is KT ¡1 and capital tomorrow is KT:
2. consumption tomorrow (in period T) is given by the consumption
function in the new steady state, cT(¢).
3. Solve for the consumption decision rule at T ¡ 1 across the grid on
individual wealth and productivity, cT ¡1(a;e : KT¡1;KT;cT(¢)).
284. Move back one period to T¡2; and solve for cT¡2(a;e : KT¡2;KT¡1;cT¡1(¢)):
5. Continue moving back until we have decision rule functions ci(a;e :
Ki;Ki+1; ci+1(¢)); i = 1:::T ¡ 1:
8. Now start updating the path of capital. The procedure below is a Gauss
Seidel algorithm. The basic problem we have is one of …nding a sequence of
capital stocks such that when hosueholds optimize markets clear at every
date and government debt eventually stabilizes at a …nite level. A Newton
Raphson approach would start by computing excess demand at every date
before updating any values for capital in the sequence. The advantage of
the Gauss Seidel method is that we update continuously.
1. Take the initial steady state distribution over wealth and productivity
and use c1(a;e : K1;K2;c2(¢)) to compute the implied joint distribution
in period 2:
2. Compute the value for aggregate capital in the second period of tran-
sition, c K2 that is implied by c1(a; e : K1;K2;c2(¢)): This is given by
aggregate savings minus B2:
3. Compare K2 (the value for capital in period 2 that was used to compute
household savings decisions) and compare it to c K2: Set K2 = K2 +
Á
³
c K2 ¡ K2
´
where 0 < Á < 1:
4. Recompute ¿n and the sequence for government debt.
5. Recompute c2(a;e : K2;K3;c3(¢)) and c1(a;e : K1;K2;c2(¢)):
6. Using the initial steady state distribution over wealth and productivity,
simulate the economy forward two periods with savings rules given
by c1(a;e : K1; K2;c2(¢)) and c2(a;e : K2;K3;c3(¢)):to compute the
implied value for c K3.
7. Given c K3, adjust K3; and recompute ¿n; the sequence for government
debt, and c3(¢); c2(¢) and c1(¢):
8. Iterate forward until we have updated K2:::KT¡1;
9. If the new sequence for capital is the same as the old, we have found the
equilibrium path. Otherwise go back to step 5, resolve for the new labor
tax given the updated capital sequence, and proceed.
10. Once the sequence for capital has converged, check whether T is su¢cient
by increasing T and checking whether the equilibrium path is a¤ected. In
all experiments T has been set to 80, implying that the aggregate capital
stock converges to its new steady state level with 80 years.
29A.4. E¢ciency
In this appendix we prove proposition 2.1. To show that all households experience
































For all i; let ¢e
























































t log(1 + ¢
e):
Thus for all i; ¢e
i = ¢e.
30Table 1: Parameter values (yearly basis)
Market structure
Incomplete Complete
Aggregate production α 0.36
δ 0.1





















Consumption tax 5.7 15.0 21.3 15.7
Labor income tax 23.6 26.4 42.7 37.8
Capital income tax 40.1 54.1 24.1 26.6
1990-1996
Consumption tax 5.4 16.8 19.4 16.5
Labor income tax 26.9 24.3 48.8 42.1
Capital income tax 39.7 47.7 25.0 26.2
                                                
* These figures are computed using the method described by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) and OECD






















K/Y initial 2.34 2.13
final 2.68 2.54
C/Y initial 0.565 0.584
final 0.546 0.562
Y initial 0.528 0.500
final 0.570 0.553
r (% post-tax) initial 3.23 4.17
final 3.42 4.17
post-tax asset to initial 0.21 0.25
labor income ratio final 0.28 0.34
                                                








Gini 0.78 0.78 0.78
99-100% 29.6 11.6 11.6
90-100% 66.1 60.2 60.2
80-100% 79.5 83.9 83.9
0-40% 1.35 1.35 1.35







Gini 0.78 0.74 0.72
99-100% 29.6 10.1 10.8
90-100% 66.1 55.4 56.5
80-100% 79.5 79.0 79.2
0-40% 1.35 1.81 4.21




                                                
* The data column is taken from Diaz-Gimenez et. al. (1997) whose data source is the 1992 Survey of Consumer















Q1 20 0.01 -3.25 0.0
Wealth Q2 20 0.01 -3.17 0.0
quintile Q3 20 0.01 -3.09 0.1
Q4 20 0.18 -0.64 33.4
Q5 20 0.96 5.77 99.9
Low 5.25 0.70 -1.57 20.2
Productivity Medium 89.50 0.21 -1.12 23.7
High 5.25 0.19 4.00 84.5
Entire
population
100 0.23 -0.88 26.7
Complete Markets Economy
Q1 20 0.01 -3.04 0.0
Wealth Q2 20 0.01 -2.97 0.0
quintile Q3 20 0.01 -2.88 0.0
Q4 20 0.17 -0.24 41.7
Q5 20 1.05 6.92 100.0
Entire
population
100 0.25 -0.44 28.3





Low -3.49    (0.0) -2.96    (0.0) 1.51    (94.5)
Productivity Medium -3.39    (0.0) -3.16    (0.0) 0.51    (86.8)
High -1.58    (1.5) -1.46    (1.9) 0.72    (83.9)
Complete Markets Economy
-3.18 -2.95 1.07Table 7: Comparison of alternative tax reforms
Average gain from reform (% of period consumption)
Fraction within group that gains (%) in parentheses
New τ
k = 0 New τ
k = 25.6 New τ
k = 47.7
Incomplete Markets Economy
Wealth Q1 -3.25 (0.0) -1.00 (0.0) 0.27 (99.1)
quintile Q3 -3.09 (0.1) -0.94 (0.3) 0.25 (98.2)
Q5 5.77 (99.9) 2.28 (100.0) -0.92 (0.0)
Low -1.57 (20.2) -0.42 (22.0) 0.06 (76.4)
Productivity Medium -1.12 (23.7) -0.23 (25.5) -0.01 (71.1)
High 4.00 (84.5) 1.69 (89.9) -0.72 (3.2)
Entire Welfare gain -0.88 (26.7) -0.14 (28.7) -0.04 (67.8)
population Efficiency gain 0.12 0.22 -0.17
Distributional gain -1.00 -0.36 0.13
Complete Markets Economy
Wealth Q1 -3.04 (0.0) -0.75 (0.0) 0.09 (100.0)
quintile Q3 -2.88 (0.0) -0.69 (0.0) 0.07 (100.0)
Q5 6.92 (100.0) 2.80 (100.0) -1.15 (0.0)
Entire Welfare gain -0.44 (28.3) 0.18 (31.8) -0.23 (60.7)
population Efficiency gain 1.07 0.72 -0.42
Distributional gain -1.51 -0.54 0.19Table 8: Comparison of alternative parameterizations. New ττττ
k = 0
Average gain from reform (% of
period consumption)
Fraction within group that gains (%)
in parentheses
Benchmark Heaton & Lucas
Incomplete Markets Economy
Wealth Q1 -3.25 (0.0) -2.37 (0.0)
quintile Q3 -3.09 (0.1) 0.07 (53.2)
Q5 5.77 (99.9) 4.64 (100.0)
Low -1.57 (20.2) 0.08 (45.4)
Productivity Medium -1.12 (23.7) 0.55 (50.2)
High 4.00 (84.5) 1.43 (65.9)
Entire Welfare gain -0.88 (26.7) 0.57 (50.7)
population Efficiency gain 0.12 0.93
Distributional gain -1.00 -0.36
Complete Markets Economy
Wealth Q1 -3.04 (0.0) -2.34 (0.0)
quintile Q3 -2.88 (0.0) 0.18 (61.6)
Q5 6.92 (100.0) 4.67 (100.0)
Entire Welfare gain -0.44 (28.3) 0.63 (52.3)
population Efficiency gain 1.07 1.07
Distributional gain -1.51 -0.44